Can an Appointed BoG Governor Begin Official Duties Pending Confirmation?

Ghana has one of the most enduring democracies in Africa, a status achieved through the continuous resolution of tensions within its democratic institutions. Although some argue that institutional strength has declined in recent years, a review of social and traditional media, as well as recent challenges to decisions made by the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary, suggests otherwise. The more citizens engage, the more robust Ghana’s institutional framework becomes. This is evident in the heightened discourse surrounding governance and institutional processes.

In line with this democratic progression, President H.E. John Dramani Mahama, as part of his constitutional duties, nominated Dr. Johnson Asiama, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana, as the next Governor of the Central Bank. This nomination was announced on January 31, 2025. Concurrently, the outgoing Governor, Dr. Ernest Addison, was reported to be proceeding on leave from February 3, 2025, ahead of his retirement at the end of March 2025. On February 4, 2025, reports emerged that Dr. Asiama had assumed office, prompting objections from the Minority in Parliament. The Minority, through its leader, challenged the basis upon which Dr. Asiama had begun official duties without prior approval from the Council of State. In a statement, they urged him to “refrain from engaging in official duties at the Bank of Ghana until he is duly approved by the Council of State,” while suggesting that he could “seek necessary briefings outside formal assumption of office.”

However, a closer examination of the legal framework suggests that the Minority’s position may be inaccurate or overly rigid, as outlined below.

Does the Appointment of the Bank of Ghana Governor Require Council of State Approval?

According to Article 183(4)(a) of the 1992 Constitution, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana is to be “appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State for a period of four years.” Additionally, Article 285, in conjunction with Article 183(4)(b), stipulates that a person appointed as Governor, who subsequently chairs the board, cannot be in the service of the Bank of Ghana at the time of appointment. This legal framework is reinforced by Section 17(1)(b) of the Bank of Ghana Act, 2002 (Act 612), as amended by the Bank of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 2016 (Act 918), which states that the Governor and Deputy Governors are appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State.

It is clear that neither the Constitution nor the Bank of Ghana Act mandates the Council of State to approve the Governor’s appointment. The requirement is consultation, not approval. Therefore, any assertion that approval is required misrepresents the constitutional and statutory provisions.

The Minority may have conflated consultation with approval, drawing parallels with the appointment process for Supreme Court Justices. However, the legal requirements differ significantly. Under Article 144(2) of the Constitution, Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the President “acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State, and with the approval of Parliament.” Here, Parliament has veto power. No such approval mechanism exists for the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of Ghana.

What Does It Mean for the Council of State to Be Consulted in Presidential Appointments?

The Supreme Court has definitively ruled that consultation means engaging in discussions, not seeking binding advice. The Court has emphasized that consultation does not negate a President’s decision if the Council of State holds a contrary view. Consequently, the Minority’s argument that the Governor’s appointment could be invalidated if the Council of State rejects the nomination lacks legal basis. The Constitution vests this appointment power solely in the President.

Can the President Appoint the Governor Without Consulting the Council of State?

While the President must consult the Council of State, this requirement does not equate to approval. However, the current challenge arises from the fact that a new Council of State has yet to be constituted. The Electoral Commission began the nomination process for regional representatives on January 23, 2025, closing on January 31, 2025, with elections scheduled for February 11, 2025. Given this timeline, the Council of State is not yet in place to be consulted.

Should this procedural gap prevent the President from appointing a Governor? A rigid interpretation might suggest so, but such a view would undermine governance efficiency. The President has overwhelming influence over the appointment process and should not be impeded from ensuring institutional stability, particularly for a crucial entity like the Bank of Ghana.

The Minority has suggested that the Deputy Governors could act in the Governor’s absence. Section 20(2) of the Bank of Ghana Act states that in the Governor’s absence, the First Deputy Governor assumes functional responsibilities. However, this provision presumes a temporary absence, not a vacancy requiring a substantive appointment by the President. A prolonged vacancy could disrupt the Bank’s operations, reinforcing the need for immediate appointment.

Conclusion

The President’s appointment of the Bank of Ghana Governor, pending consultation with the Council of State, is constitutionally sound. The Constitution and relevant statutes confer this authority on the President, with consultation serving as a procedural formality rather than a substantive approval mechanism. The absence of a constituted Council of State should not obstruct the President from filling key leadership positions, especially in vital institutions like the Bank of Ghana. While the Minority’s concerns underscore the importance of due process, their interpretation risks unnecessary administrative delays.

Dr. Asiama’s assumption of office aligns with a pragmatic application of constitutional provisions, ensuring continuity in the Bank’s operations while maintaining accountability. This approach balances legal fidelity with governance efficiency, reinforcing Ghana’s democratic institutions and upholding the integrity of its constitutional framework.

Source: Patrick Stephenson | kwabenastephenson@gmail.com | Mob: +233243336819

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